El pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset amplía la crítica vitalista de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX que superó el mito de los <>, criticándolo como encubridor de una farsa y creador del fraude humanístico de una tensión aporética entre vida y cultura. Los valores de la vida constituyen una afirmación ante el racionalismo extraviado en sus propios conceptos. La razón vital orteguiana es la comprensión lúcida del sencido antes que la explicación gris de estructuras. La metafísica (...) de la vida que presenta Ortega exige ir más allá de la visión antropológica centrada en la pregunta <>, lo cual lleva a un compromiso con la vivencia de la identidad generada por la biograf1a personal y los contenidos determinantes de la historia. La pregunta por la <> es una reflexión metafísica que supera los condicionantes del concepto << naturaleza humana>>.Ortega y Gasset broadens the vitalist's criticism of the second half of the 19th Century against << the ideals of civilization>> as a myth that cloaks the humanistic fraud of a tension between life and culture. Instead, the values of life stand before a rationalism puzzled by its own conceptions. Ortega´s << vital reason>> is the lucid understanding of meaning as compared with the dull explanation of structures. Ortega's metaphysics of life overcomes the anthropological view focused on the question <>and replaces it by the pivot question <>, which sets out a compromise with self-identity as originated in own personal life story within the frame of general history. The question for 'human condition' is a metaphysical reflection, which lies beyond the limitations of the concept of 'human nature'.  . (shrink)

Se trata de examinar el rendimiento del concepto de “ejecutividad” en la obra de Ortega y Gasset, en dos momentos clave: en 1914, cuando formula el programa de su filosofía de la razón vital en Meditaciones del Quijote y en los cursos de los años treinta, cuando inicia el despliegue de su filosofía de madurez, asumiendo las implicaciones historicistas de la razón vital. En el breve escrito “Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo” reflexiona sobre un problema del arte sumamente (...) concreto: ¿qué cosa es el objeto de la estética? La respuesta le llevará a conectar un esbozo de teoría de la metáfora con cuestiones de epistemología y de filosofía primera. Y, lo que es más importante: Ortega se sirve aquí de tres conceptos llamados a tener en el desarrollo posterior de su obra una formulación decisiva: ejecutividad, intimidad y presencia. Esta es la razón de que persigamos el despliegue de dichos conceptos en las formulaciones de la vida humana y del yo personal cuando intente la sistematización de su filosofía en los referidos cursos de los años treinta y en las publicaciones a ellos asociadas.I will examine the concept of “executivy” in Ortega’s work in two important moments: in 1914 when he formulates the program of his philosophy of vital reason in Meditaciones del Quijote and in the courses of the 1930s when he initiates the unfolding of his late philosophy which assumes the historicist implications of vital reason. In the short essay “Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo” he reflects about a problem in art that is extremely concrete: What is the object of aesthetics? The answer will take him to link an outline of a theory of metaphors with issues of epistemology and his primary philosophy. And, what is most important, Ortega uses three concepts that will have a decisive role in his later work: executivity, intimacy, and presence. This is the reason why I examine the unfolding of these concepts in the formulations of human life and of the I when he attempts the systematization of his philosophy in the said courses of the 1930s and the publications associated with them. (shrink)

Se trata de una carta de Heidegger a E. Blochmann fechada en 1932 enn la que se comenta el libro de un profesor español, Ortega y Gasset. El libro enviado es una colecciónde ensayos que contiene _El tema de nuestro tiempo_, entre otros, aparecido en alemán en 1928, en traducción de Helene Weyl.

El presente texto aborda la figura de José Gaos que Antonio Zirión nos transmite en su reciente libro El sentido de la filosofía desde dos aspectos: por un lado, Gaos como profesor de filosofía y, por otro, Gaos como filósofo interesado en la tensión no resuelta entre la fenomenología y la metafísica y en la metafísica como problema en sí. Se discute también el lugar que Gaos asignó a la “soberbia” como una faceta esencial del quehacer filosófico y la idea (...) de que las afirmaciones filosóficas son, en última instancia, expresiones de una perspectiva vital personalísima y única. (shrink)

“Llega a ser el que eres”, lema de Píndaro, es la nota final que unifica filosofía y biografía en Ortega porque actúa como vínculo, a la vez ético y vital, entre el yo y el mundo. Dicho vínculo se llama técnicamente “vocación”, y en la filosofía tardía de Ortega es la única fuente de sentido de la propia vida. La vocación decisiva de Ortega fue la intelectual o filosófica, en el sentido socrático-platónico, no la del “intelectual” como figura que interviene (...) en asuntos públicos, aunque asumiera ese papel con notable intensidad hasta 1932 o 1933. Desde que la Guerra Civil española estalla decidió no ma- nifestarse sobre temas políticos. Uno de los textos que más a fondo reflexiona sobre la condición del intelectual en el doble sentido indicado fue “El intelectual y el otro” (1940), que dialoga dramáticamente con la circunstancia argentina en la que y para la que fue escrito, pero que tuvo repercusiones en el mundo del exilio republi- cano en la América hispana, especialmente en México. (shrink)

Se trata de analizar el puesto que ocupa El tema de nuestro tiempo en el conjunto de la obra de Ortega, en su camino hacia la llamada “Segunda navegación”, es decir, hacia su filosofía de madurez. Después de contextualizar el libro en la cultura europea de la época, describiendo las novedades que acontecieron en torno a 1921-23 y la situación histórica por la que atravesaba España, en plena crisis del sistema de la Restauración, se entra en el examen de los (...) conceptos nucleares “vida”, “generación”, “racionalismo”, “perspectivismo”, en torno a los cuales Ortega elabora su propuesta filosófica. Las grandes cuestiones de la cultura europea –políticas, morales, el sentido de la Historia– deben ser examinadas a la nueva luz de la razón vital, agotadas las fórmulas de la razón pura. Finalmente, se procede a una evaluación crítica del Tema. Ortega no logra renovar la idea nuclear de “vida humana” por depender aún de un enfoque naturalista y fiar la fundamentación de la razón vital a una ciencia nueva y no a una filosofía primera, como propondrá desde los cursos y textos de los años 30. (shrink)

Resumen de la tesis doctoral La consistencia del yo en el pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset, presentada en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, el 28 de noviembre de 1991, por José La.saga Medina, bajo la dirección de D. Julio Bayón Cerdán.

mRNA synthesis in all organisms is performed by RNA polymerases, which work as nanomachines on DNA templates. The rate at which their product is made is an important parameter in gene expression. Transcription rate encompasses two related, yet different, concepts: the nascent transcription rate, which measures the in situ mRNA production by RNA polymerase, and the rate of synthesis of mature mRNA, which measures the contribution of transcription to the mRNA concentration. Both parameters are useful for molecular biologists, but they (...) are not interchangeable and they are expressed in different units. It is important to distinguish when and where each one should be used. We propose that for functional genomics the use of nascent transcription rates should be restricted to the evaluation of the transcriptional process itself, whereas mature mRNA synthesis rates should be employed to address the transcriptional input to mRNA concentration balance leading to variation of gene expression. (shrink)

We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\upalpha $$\end{document}-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\upalpha $$\end{document}-equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to the allocations improving, in terms of (...) efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. _Epistemic injustice - _one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years - refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection (...) of its kind, it comprises over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, divided into five parts: Core Concepts Liberatory Epistemologies and Axes of Oppression Schools of Thought and Subfields within Epistemology Socio-political, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of Knowing Case Studies of Epistemic Injustice. As well as fundamental topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and epistemic trust, the Handbook includes chapters on important issues such as social and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, and gender and race. Also included are chapters on areas in applied ethics and philosophy, such as law, education, and healthcare. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. It will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as cultural studies, sociology, education and law. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the contributions of the pragmatist tradition to the philosophy of ethnicity. From the pragmatist philosophies of Dewey and Locke I derive a reconstructive model for the clarification and improvement of the life experiences of ethnic groups. Addressing various problems and objections, I argue that this Deweyan and Lockean reconstructive model rejects any sharp separation between race and ethnicity and avoids the pitfalls of the biologist race paradigm and the culturalist ethnicity paradigm. I explore some of (...) the social and political implications of this reconstructive model through a discussion of José Martí's inspiring account of Hispanic identity. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of oppression, focusing on racial and sexual oppression and their interconnections. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from interacting epistemically in fruitful ways--from listening to each other, learning from each other, and mutually enriching each other's perspectives. Medina's epistemology of resistance offers a contextualist theory of our complicity with epistemic injustices and a social connection model of shared responsibility for improving epistemic conditions of participation in social (...) practices. Through the articulation of a new interactionism and polyphonic contextualism, the book develops a sustained argument about the role of the imagination in mediating social perceptions and interactions. It concludes that only through the cultivation of practices of resistance can we develop a social imagination that can help us become sensitive to the suffering of excluded and stigmatized subjects. Drawing on Feminist Standpoint Theory and Critical Race Theory, this book makes contributions to social epistemology and to recent discussions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, epistemic responsibility, counter-performativity, and solidarity in the fight against racism and sexism. (shrink)

Se trata de la Presentación al libro Coordenadas Epistemológicas para una estética en construcción, obra publicada por la Colección La Fuente y coeditada entre el Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte de la BUAP y el Instituto de Filosofía de Cuba. En la presentación se describen los contenidos básicos de las tres partes que componen el libro: Parte I. Una estética en construcción; Parte II: El arte en el discurso de la estética; Parte III: Espectacularidad y seducción. Miradas estéticas a (...) la socialidad contemporánea. También se hace referencia al papel jugado por la Dra. Alicia Pino en la concepción, contenido y estructura de este libro, a cuya memoria se dedica. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

Propongo la expresión “forma-centauro” para caracterizar la escritura orteguiana porque en ella predominó el ensayo, pero este tuvo desde el principio la pretensión de pensar filosófica, es decir, sistemáticamente. Por tanto este escrito se ocupa de reflexionar sobre la polémica del ensayo filosófico, polémica que viene de lejos (Lukács, Adorno), recuperada en la filosofía hispánica (Gaos, Nicol). Concluyo con un análisis sobre el específico genus dicendi que aportó Ortega a la filosofía del siglo XX y su propuesta de un sistema (...) abierto. (shrink)

Desde la certidumbre del sentido necesariamente inacabado, nómada y abierto de sus propuestas, el presente volumen de la Colección La Fuente da cuentas del esfuerzo de un grupo de investigadores del Instituto de Filosofía de La Habana (IF) y de la Universidad Autónoma de Puebla (BUAP) por esbozar, más que respuestas, aquellas interrogantes sociales, culturales y artísticas que, desde constelaciones cambiantes de conceptos y reflexiones estéticas, puedan ser emplazadas en sus respectivas realidades. El presente libro es el tercero de la (...) serie Redes, dedicada a plasmar los principales resultados del trabajo de colaboración del Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte de la BUAP con otros grupos de investigación. La coordinación de esta entrega contó con la sapiencia y laboriosidad académica de la doctora Alicia Pino Rodríguez (1954-2017), investigadora del IF, integrante del Consejo de la Colección, coordinadora de su segundo volumen y parte esencial de este, dedicado a su memoria. (shrink)

This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention (...) to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits. (shrink)

While in agreement with Miranda Fricker’s context-sensitive approach to hermeneutical injustice, this paper argues that this contextualist approach has to be pluralized and rendered relational in more complex ways. In the first place, I argue that the normative assessment of social silences and the epistemic harms they generate cannot be properly carried out without a pluralistic analysis of the different interpretative communities and expressive practices that coexist in the social context in question. Social silences and hermeneutical gaps are misrepresented if (...) they are uniformly predicated of an entire social context, instead of being predicated of particular ways of inhabiting that context by particular people in relation to particular others. I contend that a more nuanced—polyphonic—contextualization offers a more adequate picture of what it means to break social silences and to repair the hermeneutical injustices associated with them. In the second place, I argue that the particular obligations with respect to hermeneutical justice that differently situated subjects and groups have are interactive and need to be determined relationally. That is, whether individuals and groups live up to their hermeneutical responsibilities has to be assessed by taking into account the forms of mutual positionality, relationality, and responsivity (or lack thereof) that these subjects and groups display with respect to one another. The central argument is developed through an examination of what in race theory and in contemporary epistemologies of ignorance has been termed “white ignorance”; that is, the kind of hermeneutical inability of privileged white subjects to recognize and make sense of their racial identities, experiences, and social positionality. (shrink)

En este artículo se parte de la crítica de Feuerbach a la religión para recuperar el sentido humanista de dicha crítica, que más que una afirmación del ateísmo o una negación de la existencia de Dios es una defensa de la dignidad y de la libertad humana. A lo largo de este estudio se sitúa el pensamiento de Feuerbach más allá de la discusión entre el teísmo y el ateísmo, estableciendo un diálogo que deja a un lado las limitaciones de (...) esta dicotomía. En la Historia de la filosofía se ha insistido en la importancia del pensamiento de Feuerbach para la posterior filosofía de la sospecha, pero en este caso se recorre una vía menos explorada: su relación con el pensamiento dialógico y la religión del amor. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente papel de trabajo es el de examinar los problemas derivados de la diferenciación entre matemáticas y dialéctica en República VI-VII. Se trata de una lectura problemática de los pasajes donde se expone el método dialéctico en este diálogo, a saber, el símil de la línea (509c-511e). Todo ello lo pretendemos abordar a la luz de las implicaciones a) epistemológicas, b) ontológicas y c) metodológicas. Mostraremos las dificultades que se derivan de las tres perspectivas propuestas, en torno (...) a la relación de identidad o diferencia entre matemática y dialéctica. Palabras clave: Platón; República; Matemáticas; Dialéctica; UnidadThe aim of this paper is to examine the problems derived from differentiating between Mathematics and Dialectics in Republic VI-VII. We undertake a problematic reading of the passages where dialectic method is expounded in this dialogue, namely, the simile of the line (509c-511e). We intend to approach all of this in the light of implications of these sorts: a) epistemological, b) ontological, and c) methodological. We will show the difficulties, derived from the three perspectives proposed, regarding the relation of identity or difference between Mathematics and Dialectics. Keywords: Plato; Republic; Mathematics; Dialectics; Unity. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that epistemic injustices can be understood and explained as social pathologies of recognition, and that this way of conceptualizing epistemic injustices can help us develop proper diagnostic and corrective treatments for them. I distinguish between two different kinds of recognition deficiency—quantitative recognition deficits and misrecognitions—and I ague that while the rectification of the former simply requires more recognition, the rectification of the latter calls for a shift in the mode of recognition, that is, a deep (...) transformation of the recognition dynamics so that other forms of recognition can emerge. Arguing against incremental recognitional approaches that aim only at increasing social visibility/audibility, I examine communicative dysfunctions around the phenomenon of racist violence in order to show how problems of misrecognition persist and become recalcitrant even when quantitative recognition deficits disappear. (shrink)

Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein's philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.

This paper offers an analysis of how the American criminal justice system sets unfair constraints on the epistemic agency of detained subjects and promotes unfair negative consequences on the exerc...

Expanding Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, recent accounts of agential epistemic injustice (Lackey, 2020; Medina, 2021; Pohlhaus, 2020) have focused on cases in which the epistemic agency of individuals or groups is unfairly blocked, constrained, or subverted. In this article I argue that agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression. (...) I identify two harms that such injustice inflicts on marginalized groups: epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of resistant epistemic group agency. My analysis shows how the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur through unfair epistemic exclusions in group dynamics, but also through forms of inclusion in group dynamics that distort or coopt the epistemic agency of the group. Following Emmalon Davis (2018) and her analysis of epistemic appropriation, I argue that the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur when the resistant epistemic resources of a marginalized group are appropriated in a way that disempowers them and critically defangs their resistant epistemic agency. I use Taylor Rogers’ (2021) analysis of the epistemic appropriation of “#MeToo” and “intersectionality” to show how epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging work in unjust epistemic group dynamics. The article offers a diagnosis of the failures of epistemic responsibility involved in agential epistemic injustice, and some suggestions for resisting those failures and working toward more responsible and just epistemic group dynamics. (shrink)

Using Iris Marion Young’s framework, this essay looks at racial violence as one of the many “faces” of racial oppression. In the light of this analysis I argue that the fight against racial violence requires much more than identifying the perpetrators of such violence and bringing them to justice; it requires, I argue, thick critical engagements with multiple publics and institutions and with society at large, engagements that are not only cognitive and argumentative but also affective, imaginal, and action-oriented. My (...) argument about the broad range of thick critical engagements needed in anti-racist-violence activism focuses especially on what I term epistemic activism, which refers to the critical activities of denouncing, contesting, and resisting the cognitive-affective attitudes and sensibilities that facilitate complicity with racial oppression and with racial violence. My analysis pays particular attention to the role that affectivity plays in complicity with racial violence and how affective attitudes can be used in epistemic activism to disrupt complicity and to mobilize people in the fight against racial violence. My analysis and argumentation are developed through a case study of epistemic activism: the activism against racial violence in the United States and the changes in public life and institutional recognition that activist organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Equal Justice Initiative have aimed to promote. (shrink)